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  1Banking Environment, Agency Costs, 
and Loan Syndication: 








Bank loan syndicate structure can be considered as an organizational response to 
agency problems stemming from the syndication process. The banking environment also 
influences the syndication process. We investigate how syndicate structure is influenced 
by the characteristics of the banking environment, such as banking market structure, 
financial development, banking regulation and supervision, and legal risk. The results of 
a cross-country analysis performed on a sample of 15,586 syndicated loan facilities from 
24 countries over a period of 15 years confirm that syndicate structure is influenced by 
banking environments consistent with agency costs minimization and efficient re-
contracting objectives. 
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  21. INTRODUCTION 
In 2006, the market for syndicated loans
1 reached 2.8 trillion USD (Thomson 
Financial, 2006) and represented more than one third of the funds raised on the 
worldwide financial markets (Altunbas, Gadanecz and Kara, 2006). This tremendous 
growth can be attributed to the advantages inherent in syndicated lending for borrowers 
and lenders. Lenders can diversify loan portfolios and sources of income. Furthermore, 
lenders can exploit comparative advantages of syndicate members through financing and 
information sharing. Syndication leads to more competitive pricing and more flexible 
funding structure, which benefit borrowers. In addition, the borrower is restricted to 
negotiation with one bank and he can benefit from potential bilateral relationships with 
other syndicate members. 
Informational frictions between the members of the syndicate can lead to agency 
problems. Therefore, the numerous advantages come at a cost. In a syndicated loan 
setting, the participants delegate monitoring to an arranger whose efforts are 
unobservable, which may generate moral hazard problems. Additionally, if the private 
information collected by the arranger through due diligence or through previous lending 
relationships cannot be credibly communicated to the participants, an adverse selection 
problem arises. Furthermore, the syndicate is also exposed to the influence of the banking 
environment. The latter influences corporate ownership, financing policies, capital 
allocation and the terms of bank loan contracts. 
The structure of a syndicate can be considered as an organizational response to 
agency costs (Pichler and Wilhelm, 2001). The arranger’s role is to  monitor the efforts of 
                                                 
1 A syndicated loan is a loan which is provided to the borrower by two or more banks, which is governed 
by a single loan agreement. We present the process of bank loan syndication in section 2. 
  3participants and he or she can consequently adapt the size and the composition of the 
syndicate, which involves explicit and implicit costs and revenue tradeoffs. For instance, 
the arranger decides on the institutions to invite, chooses the initial menu of designated 
amounts for participation, and the dollar size and associated fees for each bracket. 
Furthermore, the arranger can adjust his or her portion of the loan to align with 
monitoring incentives, establish a signal of borrower’s quality, and form a smaller 
syndicate to fund opaque and risky borrowers. Finally, the presence of multiple co-
arrangers can mitigate adverse selection problems by over-seeing a lead arranger. 
In this article, we empirically investigate how the banking environment influences 
the structure of syndicates, which is designed to be adapted to agency problems stemming 
from the syndication process. After controlling for various loan agreement terms and 
borrower’s financial characteristics, we focus on several characteristics of this 
environment, including banking sector structure, financial development, bank prudential 
regulation, and legal risk. Using the power of cross-country analysis, we perform our 
study on a sample of more than 15,000 syndicated loan facilities covering 24 markets 
over a period of 15 years. 
This article completes and further develops existing empirical research on 
syndicate structure by Lee and Mullineaux (2004), Jones, Lang and Nigro (2005), Bosch 
and Steffen (2006), and Sufi (2007). The above authors demonstrate that syndicates on 
the US and the UK markets are structured to enhance monitoring efforts and to facilitate 
renegotiation. These studies focus solely on single markets and do not account for the 
influence of the banking environment on syndicate structure. However, following a large 
body of research on law and finance pioneered by La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer 
  4and Vishny (1997) and recently by Qian and Strahan (2007), the banking environment 
has a significant impact on the design of loan contracts, banking performance and 
economic and financial development. In regards to syndicated lending, Esty and 
Megginson (2003) found that syndicates funding project finance are larger and more 
diffuse in countries with poorly defined creditor rights and weak banking legal systems. 
However, Esty and Megginson’s (2003) results addressed a specific loan purpose and did 
not provide in depth insights into the influence of other components of the banking 
environment on syndicate structure. 
In the remaining sections of this article, we discuss the theoretical and empirical 
background of syndication in section 2 and we present the empirical design of our work 
and discuss our results in section 3. Finally we provide an overview of our conclusions in 
section 4. 
2. LOAN SYNDICATION AND SYNDICATE STRUCTURE 
(i) Loan syndication and agency problems 
The members of a syndicate can be divided into two groups. The senior banks 
bearing mandated arrangers, arrangers, or agents titles, are typically appointed by the 
borrower to bring together the bank syndicate. These lenders are often the borrower’s 
relationship banks and form the “core” of the syndicate – the arrangers – who retain a 
portion of the loan and look for junior members – the participants. The latter, typically 
bearing manager or participant titles, earn a spread for funding a portion of the loan. 
The process of bank loan syndication can be separated into three main stages. 
During the pre-mandated phase, the borrower solicits competitive offers to arrange and 
manage the syndication with one or more banks. The borrower chooses one or more 
  5arrangers that are mandated to form a syndicate, and consequently negotiates a 
preliminary loan agreement. The arranger acts as the syndicate’s agent, which involves 
such tasks as funds administration, interest calculation, and covenants enforcement. 
During the post-mandated phase, the arranger begins the syndication process. This 
involves drafting a preliminary loan contract and preparing a documentation package for 
the potential syndicate members, called an information memorandum. The memorandum 
contains information about a borrower’s creditworthiness and the loan terms. A roadshow 
is then organized to present and discuss the content of the memorandum, to present fees, 
establish a timetable for commitments and closing, formally invite potential participants 
and determine allocations. The third and last phase takes place after completion, when the 
loan becomes operational, binding the borrower and the syndicate members to the debt 
contract. 
Loan syndication results in several agency problems. First, private information 
about the borrower can create adverse selection issues, as the arranger may be inclined to 
syndicate loans from unreliable borrowers. However, such opportunistic behavior 
generates a reputation risk for the arranger and negatively affects the success of future 
syndications (Pichler and Wilhelm, 2001). Second, the participating banks delegate 
monitoring tasks to the arranger. However, participant banks are not privy to the efforts 
of the arranger, leading to moral hazard problems. Nonetheless, the arranger has less 
incentive to monitor the borrower than if it were to lend the full amount of the loan 
(Pennacchi, 1988). Third, an important issue in syndication is related to borrower's 
financial distress. Funding is more complicated in such settings because lenders must 
reach a collective decision (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996). 
  6The structure of the syndicate should be equipped to tackle such agency problems. 
For instance, to provide credible signal regarding the quality of the borrower and to align 
monitoring incentives, the arranger adjusts its own loan portion (Jones, Lang and Nigro, 
2005; Sufi, 2007). Syndicates are usually smaller and more cohesive when little 
information about the borrower is available, when credit risk is relatively high and when 
a loan is secured (Lee and Mullineaux, 2004). Furthermore, the presence of multiple 
specialized co-agents can mitigate adverse selection problems through arranger 
monitoring (François and Missonier-Piera, 2007). 
The business, regulatory and competitive environment in which the syndicate 
operates can also affect its structure. For instance, as shown by La Porta, Lopez-De-
Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 1998), the legal environment has a significant 
influence on corporate ownership, financing policies and capital allocation. Recently, 
Qian and Strahan (2007) have shown that the price and non-price terms of bank loan 
contracts are adjusted to the legal and financial environment. Regarding cases in bank 
loan syndication, Esty and Megginson (2003) show that the size and concentration of 
bank syndicates funding project finance are influenced by the legal risk involved in the 
loan process.  
(ii) Determinants of syndicate structure 
Following the theoretical and empirical background related to the bridge between 
syndicate structure, agency problems and the banking environment, we now turn to the 
various country-level determinants expected to influence syndicate size. Syndicate size is 
defined by two dependent variables: Number of Lenders and Number of Arrangers. We 
make this distinction because senior members of the syndicate have different concerns 
  7and motivations compared to other participants. For example, the same factors can 
influence the terms of a loan depending on the lender’s status in the syndicate hierarchy
2.  
Banking structure is a two variable proxy. Overheads, defined as the ratio of 
banking overhead costs to total assets, measures cost inefficiency in a banking industry. 
Cost efficient banks should be more effective in risk management, screening and 
monitoring and consequently less exposed to hidden information problems within the 
syndicate. Also, since syndicated loans imply the sharing of administration and 
origination costs, cost inefficiency is expected to encourage the formation of larger 
syndicates. Consequently, we can expect a positive coefficient for this variable. 
Concentration, defined as the assets of the three largest banks as a share of all bank 
assets, proxies market structure in the industry. Several arguments suggest this variable 
should have a negative influence on syndicate size. First, a greater concentration means a 
lower number of potential participants to join a syndicate. Second, banks with greater 
market shares in a banking industry already benefit from diversified loan portfolios and 
have little incentive to diversify further. Finally, the motivation provided by increased 
revenue from syndicated loans should exert a lower effect for banks with greater 
profitability, generally due to stronger market power. 
We also include two variables that consider the development of financial markets. 
Stock Markets is defined as the value of listed shares to GDP and measures the 
development of stock markets. Allen and Gottesman (2006) have shown that stock 
markets and syndicated loan markets are highly integrated, facilitating information flow 
among markets. The development of stock markets contributes to information disclosure. 
                                                 
2 To avoid biased results, we do not distinguish the number of participants, as the same financial institution 
can have several roles in a syndicate, being simultaneously an arranger and a participant. 
  8The availability of information mitigates the adverse selection problems resulting from 
the private information owned by the lead bank on the borrower. Consequently, we 
should observe a positive coefficient for this variable. However, one may also consider 
that for some companies, stock markets are an alternative source of financing for large 
loans. Therefore, the more developed the stock market the greater potential for a 
reduction in the syndicated loan potential. Subsequently, an increase in the share of non 
syndicated bank loans is observed. Such influences should be even more prominent for 
the development of bond markets, measured by the sum of private and public domestic 
debt securities to GDP. In regards to large financing needs of companies, bonds directly 
compete for syndicated loans. However, this negative influence may also be offset by the 
positive effect of the existence of bond markets, which contribute to increased 
information for participant banks in loan syndicates and therefore limits the adverse 
selection problems. 
Banking regulation is our third category of banking environment variables. We 
first construct the variable Mincar x Credit Risk. This variable is the product of the 
minimum capital requirement value and a dummy variable equal to one if the minimum 
regulatory capital ratio varies with bank credit risk. On the one hand, we expect a positive 
coefficient for this variable. The existence of capital requirements should favor 
syndication through the motivation of lending limit respect. This considers the fact that a 
stronger requirement increases the motivation relevance. On the other hand, a negative 
coefficient can also be observed. This capital requirement reduces the number of 
potential syndication participants eligible in terms of adequate capitalization and 
therefore in terms of funding advantages. The regulation on lending abroad should 
  9positively influence syndicate size, because such regulation reduces diversification 
opportunities for domestic banks. We therefore expect a positive coefficient of Abroad 
Loan Prohibited, a dummy variable equal to one under the prohibition of loan funding 
abroad, because such prohibitions make syndication more attractive to gain more 
diversified loan portfolios. 
Supervisory mechanisms are introduced with three variables: NPL Definition (a 
dummy variable equal to one if a formal definition of non performing loans exists), 
Public Risk Disclosure (a dummy variable equal to one if regulations are imposed to a 
bank’s public disclosure of their risk management procedures), and Examination 
Frequency (a variable equal to one, two or three if the frequency of onsite inspections 
occurs one, two or three times a year). If binding, these regulatory features should have a 
positive influence on syndicate size as they enhance transparency on participant banks 
loan portfolios through supervisory discipline
3.  
Our fourth and final category of banking environment variables considers the 
legal environment as one that operates contracts and enforcement depends on the legal 
system where the borrower is located. Two legal institution indicators are included in our 
analysis. Protection of creditor rights and law enforcement is measured with the Creditor 
Rights and Rule of Law indices. The Rule of Law ranges from zero to ten with a higher 
score indicating better law enforcement while Creditor Rights are scored on a scale from 
zero to four with a higher score indicating better creditors’ protection. The expected sign 
of the coefficient for both variables is ambiguous. Esty and Megginson (2003) find that 
syndicates funding project finance are larger and more diffuse in countries with poorly 
                                                 
3 Additional candidate variables for regulatory discipline and disclosure were the obligation to publicly 
disclose off-balance sheet items and the presence of public or private credit registry, but we do not include 
them in our estimations as they account for more than 95% of the loans in the sample. 
  10defined creditor rights and weak banking legal systems. Thus, lenders structure 
syndicates to facilitate re-contracting in countries where creditors have strong and 
enforceable rights. Additionally, better bank legal protection mitigates the moral hazard 
problem induced by syndicated loans. Indeed, better creditor protection decreases the 
need to monitor the borrower. This reduces agency problems resulting from bank 
monitoring efforts involved in the syndicate. Furthermore, in high legal risk countries, 
efficient reorganization of a distressed borrower might be difficult. Hence, larger 
syndicate structure is better suited to deal with these issues as they minimize hold-up 
problems. However, on a more global basis, agency problems resulting from lending 
decisions should also be mitigated, which may favor the choice of a standard loan rather 
than a syndicated loan for the lead bank. Indeed, the motive for risk sharing should play a 
decreased role in well-protected legal environments. Hence, monitoring should be more 
important in the presence of high legal risk (few legal rights and low contract 
enforcement), through a smaller syndicate and/or a larger number of arrangers. Finally, 
we also control for the origin of the legal structure in the borrower country through a 
dummy variable equal to one if it is French. 
Following previous studies of syndicate structure (Lee and Mullineaux, 2004; 
Sufi, 2007), we control for several different loan agreements and borrower 
characteristics. We include the following loan characteristics: size and maturity, the 
availability of public information (dummy variable equal to one if a Standard and Poor’s 
senior debt rating is available) and borrower’s reputation (equal to the occurrence of a 
particular borrower in the sample
4), and four dummies taking lender’s protection into 
                                                 
4 Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders and Srinivasan (2007) construct similar indicators to investigate the benefits of 
lending relationships for banks. 
  11account (Guarantors, Sponsors, Covenants, Senior Debt). We also consider the number 
of syndicated loan facilities by country to control for syndicated lending market 
development and type (Term Loan), purpose (General Corporate,  Debt Repayment, 
Project Finance, Working Capital) and the loan benchmark rate (Libor and Euribor) 
through the inclusion of dummy variables
5. Dummy variables for year, region and 
industry are also included in the regressions. Regarding borrower’s characteristics, 
following Sufi (2007) and Bosch and Steffen (2007), we focus on its creditworthiness, 
through the inclusion of four variables, controlling for size (logarithm of Total Assets), 
profitability (EBIT / Total Assets), interest coverage (EBITDA / Interest Expenses), and 
leverage (Total Debt / Total Capital). 
3. EMPIRICAL DESIGN AND RESULTS 
(i) Data and methodology 
Syndicated loans sample is obtained from the Dealscan database, provided by the 
Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC, Reuters). Financial structure and regulatory and 
supervisory characteristics data are gathered from Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 
(2000) and Barth, Caprio and Levine (2005). Indicators of legal environment come from 
La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998). Borrower’s characteristics are 
extracted from the Compustat database
6.  
Sample size is determined by data availability from variables used in regression 
analyses. Following Lee and Mullineaux (2004), we employ only completed and fully 
confirmed deals, excluding private placements. We ultimately generate a full sample of 
                                                 
5 We do not provide variables for other types and purposes in our regressions, since they represent less than 
5% of the loans in the sample. 
6 We match borrowers by their country, name and industry sector. This procedure reduces somehow the 
size of the full sample. Borrower’s variables are one year lagged to the syndicated loan completion year. 
  1215,586 loan facilities from 24 countries for the period between 1990 and 2005. The 
number of loan facilities, the average number of lenders and arrangers, and lending 
amount by country are displayed in Table 1, while Table 2 provides descriptive statistics 
for the variables. The definitions of variables are provided in Table A.1 in the appendix. 
-  Insert Table 1 about here – 
  Japan appears as the largest syndicated loan market with more than 4,000 loan 
facilities operating over the period under investigation, followed by Australia, Germany, 
Spain, South Korea and Taiwan, each with more than 1,000 facilities. On average, the 
number of lenders ranges between five and 14 and two and seven arrangers. Finally, the 
average loan size is between 100 and 1,000 million USD, with the largest average deals 
approved in Germany. 
-    Insert Table 2 about here – 
Results from the full sample descriptive statistics reveals that the average 
syndicate has almost nine lenders and three arrangers, with an average loan size of 333 
million USD for an average maturity of five years. In comparison, from 1987 to 1995 in 
the USA, Lee and Mullineux (2004) report an average number of nine lenders, with 
average loan size equal to 221 million USD and an average four-year maturity. On a 
more recent time span (1992-2003), Sufi (2007) observes an average number of eight 
lenders and two arrangers. The average loan amount was 364 million USD with an 
average maturity of three years.  
On average, bank markets are concentrated and rather cost efficient, and stock and 
bond markets’ capitalization are important. Regulatory mechanisms such as non-
performing loans are quite common, contrary to abroad lending prohibition and public 
  13risk disclosure. On-site inspection of banks occur more than once per year. Finally, the 
average legal environment is satisfactory, with creditor rights indices above seven and 
the rule of law index fell in the mid-range of the scale
7.  
Following Sufi (2007) and Bosch and Steffen (2007) and due to the fact that the 
dependent variables take large numbers of values (from two to 80 for Number of Lenders 
and from one to 27 for Number of Arrangers), we estimate the following set of individual 
equations using OLS regressions with robust standard errors and clusters at the borrower 
level
8: 
Number of Lenders = f(Banking Environment, Loan Characteristics, Borrower Characteristics)
              ( 1 )  
Number of Arrangers = g(Banking Environment, Loan Characteristics, Borrower Characteristics)
           ( 2 )    
(ii) Results and discussion 
We perform three series of regressions for equations (1) and (2) with different sets 
of explanatory variables. Results are provided in Table 3. The first set of regressions (1.1 
and 1.2) is a benchmark displaying only loan agreement and borrower characteristics. We 
drop loan characteristics in the second set (2.1 and 2.2) and we instead include banking 
environment characteristics. Finally, the third set (3.1 and 3.2) includes all characteristics 
and also serves to evaluate the robustness of our results. 
-  Insert Table 3 about here – 
We first observe that all regression analyses have satisfactory explanatory power 
with R² equal to at least 30%. We also remark that most of the loan agreement 
characteristics are significant and robust across regression analyses. Loan Size reveals a 
                                                 
7 The most represented industry sectors are Financial Services, General Manufacturing, Utilities, 
Transportation and Construction. 
8 As a robustness check, we also perform Poisson and Tobit regressions and obtain virtually similar results. 
  14positive coefficient and is significant over all regressions, suggesting that larger 
syndicates form around larger loans in accordance with diversifying loan portfolios and 
regulatory-driven issues (as in Lee and Mullineaux, 2004; Sufi, 2007). The coefficient of 
Maturity demonstrates significantly positive results for most estimates. This finding can 
be explained by a negative coefficient between maturity and credit risk (Sharpe, Dennis 
and Debarshi, 2000) and is congruent with prior research on the US syndicated market. 
We also observe that borrower transparency positively influence syndicate size, in 
accordance with previous results by Lee and Mullineaux (2004) and Sufi (2007). These 
results confirm that increased transparency reduce both adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems within the syndicate. This result is confirmed by a significant and 
positive coefficient for Borrower Presence, as increased reputation leads to lower 
information asymmetry and thus less syndicate agency problems. 
Variables assessing lender’s protection mechanisms reveale that Senior Debt 
always result in a negative coefficient and is significant in equation (2) and positive in 
equation (1), while the presence of financial covenants positively affects both the number 
of lenders and of arrangers, the latter also being influenced by the presence of guarantors. 
Hence, debt seniority works as an effective protection device for all lenders, reducing 
agency problems within the syndicate and allowing for larger syndicates with fewer 
arrangers. The presence of a guarantor suggests an increased loan risk (Berger and Udell, 
1990; Jimenez and Saurina, 2004) and, consequently, a loan plagued by greater agency 
problems, for which a larger syndicate “core” composed of numerous arrangers promotes 
more effective monitoring. Finally, the restriction of discretionary power of the borrower 
through the presence of covenants effectively reduces the risk of loan default (Rajan and 
  15Winton, 1995), and enhances the ability to monitor the borrower, thereby reducing the 
monitoring costs and leading to larger syndicates
9. In regards to borrower characteristics, 
larger firms are associated with larger syndicates, in a similar manner as loan size. Also, 
more profitable borrowers reveal smaller syndicate structures, while leverage has no 
statistically significant effect on syndicate size
10. 
In the analysis of banking environment variables in specifications (1.2) and (2.2), 
the results show significance among most variables. Our results demonstrate that all 
forms of banking environment characteristics are important for the syndicate structure in 
the sense that we observe significant coefficients for legal environment, financial 
development, and banking structure and regulation. 
As expected, the cost level of the banking industry exerts a positive influence on 
the number of arrangers. Inefficient banks might have less incentive to monitor the 
borrower and therefore require a greater larger number of arrangers to perform the 
activity. Also, administration and origination cost sharing among the arrangers can 
explain such results. Our results show that banking industry concentration is negatively 
correlated to the number of lenders. As expected, greater concentration lowers the 
number of potential participants to join and form a syndicate. Also, banks holding greater 
market shares already benefite from diverse loan portfolios and have little incentive to 
diversify further. In addition, the development of bond markets is positively correlated 
with the number of lenders and negatively to the number of arrangers, implying that 
                                                 
9 Most of the dummies controlling for loan type, purpose and benchmark rate appear as significant in the 
regressions, suggesting that all loan agreement characteristics influence syndicate structure. 
10 Including alternative proxies for borrower risk, such as the Quick Ratio or the ratio of Net Income to 
Total Assets, gives similar results. 
  16better financial development can improve information flow and transparency, mitigating 
agency problems in the syndicate, which can grow larger with fewer arrangers
11. 
The coefficient of Mincar x Credit Risk shows a negative coefficient (2.2) 
suggesting that binding capital requirements can reduce the number of syndicate 
members eligible in terms of adequate capitalization and subsequently in terms of 
funding advantages. As expected, the regulation on lending abroad positively influenced 
syndicate size. Therefore, regulation reduces diversification opportunities for domestic 
banks and increases their “appetite” to fund a share of a syndicated loan while 
diversifying their portfolio. Among the proxies for regulatory discipline and 
transparency, we observe that Examination Frequency and Public Risk Disclosure have 
negative coefficients. Public Risk Disclosure influences the number of lenders only, 
suggesting that such supervisory devices tend to inform the arrangers that a large portion 
of the local potential lenders have weak or inefficient risk management procedures and 
thus do not qualify to participate in the syndication. Less frequent on-site inspections are 
negatively related to the number of arrangers, suggesting this supervisory feature 
substitutes to the monitoring activity of the arrangers. The coefficient of NPL Definition 
is significant and positive in both specifications. These results suggest that greater 
transparency regarding problem loan classification could reduce informational friction 
within the syndicate and allow the establishment of larger group of lenders. 
Finally, we observed that enhanced creditor rights protection has a negative and 
significant influence on the number of lenders but no effect on the number of arrangers. 
A better protection of creditors might reduce lenders’ incentives to monitor borrowers. 
                                                 
11 These results are robust to the use of alternative proxies for financial structure, such as the ratio of private 
credit of financial institutions to GDP. 
  17However, this may exacerbate free-riding problems, which can be tackled through an 
adapted small size syndicate structure. Furthermore, creditors could benefit from such 
protection and monitoring of the borrower by the syndicate to avoid inefficient re-
contracting in case of distress. Therefore, smaller syndicates with larger cores are more 
suitable for such tasks. As the quality of institutions increases (i.e. legal risk decreases), 
the number of arrangers diminishes as monitoring is more effective in such a legal 
environment. These results are congruent with the findings of Esty and Megginson 
(2003). Qualitatively, our results are unaffected by the use of the Creditor Rights index 
components from La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998)
12. Replacing 
Rule of Law with alternative proxies from La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997, 1998) such as Risk of Expropriation, Repudiation of Contracts, Corruption 
or  Judicial System Efficiency does not alter our results
13. Finally, we obtain similar 
results when we replace the legal origin variable with the English Law dummy. 
Our last set of regressions (1.3 and 2.3) control for all individual characteristics 
(both loan agreement and borrower) and the banking environment, and serves as a 
robustness check. We note that most of the borrower risk proxies are significant and the 
more risky firms are associated with smaller syndicates, which serve to mitigate agency 
problems. Furthermore, we also observe that when we control for borrower risk, several 
banking environment characteristics influence both lenders and arrangers, in areas such 
                                                 
12 The components are: Secured Creditor Paid First, Restriction on Reorganization, or Management Stays.  
These dummies equal to one if secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of proceeds that result 
from the disposition of assets of a bankrupt firm, if the reorganization procedure imposes restrictions, such 
as creditors’ consent, to file for reorganization, or if the debtor keeps the administration of its property 
pending the resolution of the reorganization process respectively.  
13 These variables are defined as indexes, scaled from 0 to 10 with lower scores for higher risks, corruption 
or inefficiency, assessing the risk of “outright confiscation” or “forced nationalization” and of the ‘‘risk of 
a modification in a contract”, the level of corruption in government or assessing the “efficiency and 
integrity of the legal environment as it affects business”  respectively. 
  18as bank concentration and examination frequency, while most of the remaining 
coefficients gain in magnitude. Thus, controlling for borrower characteristics reinforces 
the influence of the banking environment on syndicate structure. 
4. CONCLUSION 
Our study addressed the influence of the banking environment on syndicate 
structure in 24 countries over a period of 15 years. Our results demonstrated that most 
banking environment characteristics, such as financial development, banking regulation, 
and legal environment, have a significant influence on syndicate structure. Overall, the 
structures of syndicates are adapted to enhance monitoring of the borrower and to 
increase the efficiency of the re-contracting process in case of borrower distress. Primary 
syndication motives include loan portfolio diversification, regulatory pressure and 
management cost reduction. 
The observed influence of tested variables suggests a prominence for certain 
motives in the formation of syndicates with adapted structures. Syndicates are structured 
to minimize agency problems related to loan and borrower characteristics and country 
financial, regulatory and institutional environments. More costly banking industries 
involve larger syndicates while more concentrated banking industries reduce the number 
of lenders. Financial development in particular bond markets positively affects the size of 
the syndicate. Bank capital and banking activity regulation, as well as loan portfolio 
transparency, have a positive influence on syndicate size. Finally, syndicates are 
structured in a consistent manner with legal risk mitigation. 
Our results are congruent with previous research, which shows that syndicate 
structure is adapted to the specific agency problems related to syndication and re-
  19contracting issues (Esty and Megginson, 2003; Lee and Mullineaux, 2004;  Jones, Lang 
and Nigro, 2005; Sufi, 2007). Our results are obtained using a cross-country sample of 
more than 15,000 syndicated loan facilities from 24 countries and over a period of 15 
years, further strengthening previous findings. Furthermore, we also show that apart from 
legal risk, syndicate structure is also influenced by other components of the banking 
environment, such as banking market structure, financial development, banking 
regulation, and prudential supervision. Therefore, we can infer normative policy 
recommendations for financial regulators to take all of the banking environment 
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  23Table 1 
Syndicated loan facilities and average number of lenders, arrangers and loan 











Argentina 246 8.59 2.92 195 
Australia 1,146 7.02 2.59 407 
Austria 43 11.33 5.26 370 
Belgium 170 14.18 4.40 847 
Brazil 330 9.11 2.85 218 
Chile 226 9.98 3.65 231 
Denmark 115 10.35 3.84 666 
Finland 116 10.78 7.09 585 
Germany 1,006 11.65 5.66 1,000 
India 429 8.61 2.63 119 
Indonesia 686 10.49 2.44 128 
Ireland 165 11.24 3.91 464 
Italy 688 11.59 3.52 758 
Japan 3,954 5.91 1.25 162 
Korea (South)  1,636 8.61 3.37 201 
Malaysia 377 7.52 2.36 204 
Mexico 463 10.73 3.72 302 
Netherlands 722 9.86 3.34 604 
Peru 39 5.46 2.67 123 
Philippines 146 9.31 2.75 162 
South Africa  124 14.23 5.63 359 
Spain 1,042 11.64 4.07 526 
Taiwan 1,163 10.11 2.03 169 
Thailand 554 9.58 2.68 116 
 15,586 8.86 2.53 333 
Notes : The table above provides frequencies of loan facilities, the average 
number of lenders and of arrangers, and the mean loan size (in million 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics 
Variable Number  of 
observations 
Mean Std. dev. Min.  Max. 
Dependent variables 
Number of Lenders  15,586 8.8611 7.4639 2.0000 80.0000
Number of Arrangers  11,550 2.5324 2.7058 1.0000 27.0000
Banking environment variables 
Overheads  15,586 0.0275 0.0160 0.0023 0.1448
Concentration  15,586 0.5008 0.1551 0.2701 1.0000
Stock Markets  15,586 0.7012 0.3701 0.0773 2.8243
Bond Markets  15,586 0.8706 0.5859 0.0168 1.8780
NPL Definition  15,586 0.7005 0.4581 0.0000 1.0000
Mincar  15,586 8.1578 0.6387 8.0000 11.500
Credit Risk  15,586 0.1600 0.3666 0.0000 1.0000
Abroad Loan Prohibited  15,586 0.2236 0.4167 0.0000 1.0000
Examination Frequency  15,586 1.6148 0.6882 1.0000 3.0000
Public Risk Disclosure  15,586 0.3947 0.4888 0.0000 1.0000
Rule of Law  15,586 7.7484 1.9307 2.5000 10.0000
Creditor Rights  15,586 2.2029 0.9272 0.0000 4.0000
Loan agreement control variables 
Loan Size  15,586 333 1020 22230  81100
Maturity  15,586 56.5119 42.8570 1.0000 480.0000
Guarantors  15,586 0.0932 0.2908 0.0000 1.0000
Sponsors  15,586 0.0956 0.2940 0.0000 1.0000
Covenants  15,586 0.1759 0.3807 0.0000 1.0000
Senior Debt  15,586 0.7350 0.4414 0.0000 1.0000
S & P Rating  15,586 0.0694 0.2542 0.0000 1.0000
Borrower Presence  15,586 8.0387 12.5907 1.0000 314.0000
Borrower control variables 
Log(Total Assets)  12,473 6.9727 1.6869 2.9929 12.9182
EBITDA / Interest 
Expenses  11,311 19.0546 264.4381 -6.6916 18668.0000
EBIT / Total Assets  8,655 0.1443 0.0990 -0.1898  2.5506
Total Debt / Capital  12,249 81.4441 581.7350 3.7590  58404.5500
Notes: The table below provides descriptive statistics computed on our dataset of loan facilities. Definition of 
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Table 3 
OLS regressions explaining the structure of syndicates 
Specifications (1.1)  (2.1)  (1.2)  (2.2)  (1.3)  (2.3) 
Variables  coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e.  coef.  s.e.  coef.  s.e. 
Intercept -33.9686***  5.88  -12.7928***  1.21  -36.5257***  2.33  -8.0426***  1.08  -29.6724***  3.83 -4.0459* 2.43 
Log(Loan Size)  2.18175***  0.09  0.9740***  0.08  2.5906*** 0.06  0.5617***  0.02 2.2915*** 0.12 0.3962*** 0.05 
Maturity 0.0087***  0.00  -0.0027  0.00  -0.0024 0.00  0.0026***  0.00  0.0146***  0.00 0.0036* 0.00 
Guarantors -0.0005  0.21  0.3903**  0.15 0.126 0.17  0.0186  0.07  -0.1163  0.27 0.8367*** 0.16 
Sponsors 0.5164*  0.30  0.9436***  0.23 -0.2587 0.18  -0.1116  0.07  -0.4464* 0.27 0.0025 0.11 
Covenants 1.7881***  0.23  0.4564**  0.18  0.8582***  0.16  0.0872  0.08  1.8098***  0.29 0.0556 0.12 
Senior Debt  2.6624***  0.44  -2.7349***  0.30  1.1604***  0.23  -0.6835***  0.11 1.5146***  0.54 -0.9982*** 0.34 
S & P Rating  1.7679***  0.26  0.3292**  0.16  0.1101  0.20 0.1499* 0.09 0.9337*** 0.29 0.5268*** 0.15 
Borrower 
Presence 
0.0371* 0.02 -0.0176 0.01  0.0424***  0.01  0.0099***  0.00  0.0830***  0.03 0.0125 0.01 
Log (Total 
Assets) 




-0.0002 0.00  -0.0001**  0.00          -0.0007*** 0.00 -0.0001*** 0.00 
EBIT / Total 
Assets 
-4.1963*** 0.75 -1.4216*** 0.45          -1.9728**  0.80 0.4389 0.35 
Total Debt / 
Capital 
-0.0001 0.00 -0.0001 0.00         -0.0001***  0.00  -0.0001  0.00 
Overheads       -12.6337  6.57  23.1500*** 3.31 55.8104*** 12.31 33.9359*** 10.80 
Concentration       -2.9464***  0.80  0.9108  0.47  -3.2173*  1.66 -3.9612*** 1.40 
Stock  Markets       0.4243  0.25  0.0052 0.10  -1.7274***  0.58 -0.0381 0.36 
Bond  Markets       0.4746**  0.23  -0.6840***  0.12 1.8175***  0.39 -2.1948*** 0.22 
Mincar x Credit 
Risk 





















NPL  Definition       0.8296***  0.30  0.3141* 0.19  -0.2205  0.74 1.5261*** 0.52 
Public Risk 
Disclosure 
     -2.7688***  0.30  0.0399  0.17 -2.3506***  0.60  -0.1615  0.47 
Examination 
Frequency 
     -0.0132  0.14  -0.2506***  0.09 -0.9509*** 0.32 -1.1076*** 0.22 
Creditor  Rights       -0.8529***  0.14 0.0643 0.06  -0.5447***  0.15  -0.068  0.12 
Rule of Law          -0.1007  0.07  -0.1960***  0.03  -1.2156***  0.38 0.4281 0.25 
N 8,516  4,997  15,586  11,550  4,721  3,699 
R² 0.3544  0.4026  0.3157  0.3052  0.3889  0.5512 
Notes: The table below shows the results of OLS regressions with robust standard errors (s.e.) and clusters at the borrower level. The dependent variables are Number of 
Lenders and Number of Arrangers (equations 1 and 2 respectively), equal to the number of lenders and arrangers forming the syndicate. Definitions of variables appear in 
table A.1 in the appendix. Dummy variables for loan type (Term Loan), loan purpose (General Corporate, Debt Repayment, Working Capital, Project Finance), 
benchmark rate (Libor, Euribor), year, region, industry sector, and Syndicated Loans and French Law variables are included in the regressions but are not reported. ***, 
**, and * indicate coefficients statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 level respectively. Table A.1 
Brief description of all variables and their sources 
Variable Description  Source 
Dependent variables 
Number of Lenders  Number of lenders in the syndicate.  Dealscan 
Number of Arrangers  Number of arrangers in the syndicate.  Dealscan 
Banking environment variables 
Overheads  Ratio of banking overhead costs to total 
banking assets 
Beck et al. (2000) 
Concentration  Assets of the three largest banks as a share of 
total banking assets 
Beck et al. (2000) 
Stock Markets  Value of listed shares to GDP  Beck et al. (2000) 
Bond Markets  Public and private domestic debt securities to 
GDP 
Beck et al. (2000) 
Mincar  Minimum capital requirement value  Barth et al. (2005) 
Credit Risk  =1 if the minimum regulatory capital ratio varies 
with bank credit risk 
Barth et al. (2005) 
Abroad Loan Prohibited  =1 if banks are prohibited from granting loans 
abroad 
Barth et al. (2005) 
NPL Definition  =1 if a formal definition of non-performing loans 
exists 
Barth et al. (2005) 
Public  Risk  Disclosure  =1 if regulation impose to banks public 
disclosure of their risk management procedures 
Barth et al. (2005) 
Examination Frequency  =1, 2 or 3 if the frequency of onsite inspections 
is 1, 2 or 3 times a year 
Barth et al. (2005) 
Creditor  rights  An index aggregating four aspects of creditor 
rights. The index ranges from zero (weak 
creditor rights) to four (strong creditor rights) 
La Porta et al. (1998) 
Rule  of  Law  An index indicating the law enforcement. The 
index ranges from zero (weak enforcement) to 
ten (strong enforcement) 
La Porta et al. (1998) 
French Law  =1 if the legal system is based on the French 
law 
La Porta et al. (1998) 
Loan agreement control variables 
Loan Size  Size of the loan in million USD  Dealscan 
Maturity  Maturity of the loan in months  Dealscan 
Guarantors  =1 if there is at least one guarantor  Dealscan 
Covenants  =1 if the loan agreement includes covenants  Dealscan 
Senior Debt  =1 if debt is senior  Dealscan 
S&P Rating  =1 if the borrower has a senior debt rating by 
Standard & Poor’s 
 
Borrower  Presence  Number of times a particular borrower is 
present in the full sample 
Dealscan 
Syndicated Loans  Number of syndicated loan facilities by country  Dealscan 
Term Loan  =1 if the loan is a term loan  Dealscan 
Corporate  Purposes  =1 if the loan purpose is general corporate 
purposes funding 
Dealscan 
Debt  Repayment  =1 if the loan purpose is debt repayment 
funding 
Dealscan 
Working Capital  =1 if the loan purpose is working capital funding  Dealscan 
Project Finance  =1 if the loan purpose is project finance funding  Dealscan 
Euribor  =1 if the benchmark rate is Euribor  Dealscan 
Libor  =1 if the benchmark rate is Libor  Dealscan 
Borrower control variables 
Log(Total Assets)  Logarithm of total assets  Compustat 
EBITDA / Interest 
Expenses 
Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and 
amortization / Interest expenses 
Compustat 
EBIT / Total Assets  Earnings before interest and tax / total assets  Compustat 
Total Debt / Capital  Total debt / total capital  Compustat 
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